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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction, conferred by Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3) (2006), to
review Mr. Davis' interlocutory appeal from an order of the Fourth Judicial District Court
of Utah County. The Order Granting Defendant Provo's Motion to Dismiss and Related
Rulings is dated September 20, 2006.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES, PRESERVATION OF ISSUES.
AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

Did the trial court properly rule that Mr. Davis' seventh claim against Provo

is barred by the "catch-all" four-year statute of limitations in Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-12-25(3) (2006)? This issue was briefed and preserved by Provo in arguments
before the trial court. R. 1789-92. The standard for review of the applicability of a
statute of limitations is a matter of law and is governed by a "correctness" standard. In re
Hoopiiaina Trust (Nolan v. Hoopiiaiana). 2006 UT 53, f 19, 144 P.3d 1129.
2.

Is Mr. Davis' seventh claim also barred by the provisions of prior Utah

Code Ann. § 10-2-403 (1977), and/or its successor statute § 10-2-422 (2006)? This issue
was preserved by Provo in its pleadings and arguments made to the trial court.
R. 528-30; 1068-70; 1792-94. Issues of statutory interpretation are questions of law and
are reviewed under a correctness standard, granting no special deference to the trial
court's ruling. Pugh v. Draper City. 2005 UT 12,17, 114 P.3d 546.
3.

Is Mr. Davis' seventh claim further barred by his failure or that of his

predecessors-in-interest to contest Provo's 1978 annexation within a reasonable period of
1

time, in light of the fact that Provo fully or substantially complied with the then
applicable Utah annexation statutes? Provo raised this issue with the trial court. R. 527,
1791-94. An appellate court reviews questions of a city's full or substantial compliance
with annexation statutes for correctness, but may allow some deference to a trial court
ruling where appropriate. Szatkowski v. Bountiful City. 906 P.2d 902, 904 (Utah App.
1995).
RELEVANT STATUTES
1.

Prior Utah Code Ann. § 10-2-401 (1977), included in the Addendum as

Exhibit C.
2.

Prior Utah Code Ann. § 10-2-403 (1977), cited in paragraph 10 of Provo's

Statement of Facts, and included in the Addendum as Exhibit D.
3.

Present Utah Code Ann. § 10-2-422 (2006), cited in paragraph 14 of

Provo's Statement of Facts, and included in the Addendum as Exhibit E.
4.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25(3) (2006), cited in paragraph 18 of Provo's

Statement of Facts.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case.
In November 2005 Richard Davis ("Mr. Davis") filed an amended complaint in

this action that named a number of defendants for the first time, one of which was Provo
City ("Provo"). All of his claims involve real property located within Provo's city limits.

2

Provo is the only defendant involved in the interlocutory appeal now before this Court. In
1978 Provo annexed land that included the real property in which Mr. Davis acquired an
interest approximately 20 years later in 1998 (the "Property"). Mr. Davis' seventh claim
alleges Provo "illegally" annexed that Property nearly 30 years ago. That seventh claim is
the only claim in Mr. Davis' amended complaint now before this Court on interlocutory
appeal.
B.

Course of Proceedings and Trial Court Disposition.
After Provo was named as a party in 2005, it filed a motion to dismiss Mr. Davis'

amended complaint. The trial court treated Provo's motion as one for summary
judgment. At the hearing on its motion and in further briefing allowed by the trial court,
Provo argued that Mr. Davis' claim against the city was barred by the four-year statute of
limitations in Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25(3). Provo also asserted Mr. Davis' seventh
claim is barred by the conclusive presumptions in Utah Code Ann. § 10-2-422 or its
predecessor, § 10-2-403 (1977). On June 28, 2006, the trial court issued a memorandum
decision granting Provo's motion. The trial court held Mr. Davis' Seventh Cause of
Action was barred by the four-year statute of limitations and found that neither
§§ 10-2-403 nor 10-2-422 were statutes of limitation. Mem. Dec, Ex. A to the
Addendum. On September 20, 2006, the trial court signed its Order dismissing
Mr. Davis' Seventh Cause of Action. Order, Ex. B to Addendum. Plaintiff then filed this
interlocutory appeal.

3

PROVO'S STATEMENT OF FACTS
A.

General Response to Mr. Davis'Statement of Facts.
Except as noted below, Provo disputes all factual and conclusory assertions set out

in Mr. Davis' statement of facts. In his brief Mr, Davis repeatedly confuses a municipal
levy (see Utah Code Ann. §§ 10-2-422, 10-5-112 and 10-6-133 (2006)) with a county
valuation assessment or tax payments by a landowner resulting from that assessment (see
Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-908-913 (2006) and R. 1069-70). He equates Provo's concern
about permit compliance with his perception that Provo intends to prevent his mining
operations on the property. Appellant Br. 6, n. 10. His brief mentions his and others'
claimed interests in the Property. Those issues have not yet been decided by the trial
court, are premature and completely irrelevant to the issues presented by this appeal, as
are other matters about land use and percentages of property ownership. See Appellant
Br. 6, par. 2; id.9 at 6-7.
B.

Provo's Statement of Facts.
1.

On or about December 21, 1977, annexation petitions were filed with the

Provo City Recorder to bring an unincorporated area of Utah County, including the
Property, within the municipal boundaries of Provo City. The petitions contain apparent
signatures of Calvin Monk, John S. Belmont, Wilderness Associates' Vice President, and
Floyd Dixon's agent. One petition refers to an earlier one filed by David Grow, Steven
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Grow, Resource Dynamics, Inc., Goodlife, Johnson & Lofgreen, and Paddy Associates.
R. 566-69.
2.

On January 19, 1978, Provo's Board of Commissioners passed an

annexation resolution to bring certain land, including the Property, within Provo's city
limits. R. 559-61.
3.

The annexation resolution recites: (a) a majority of the real property owners

and owners of at least one-third of the real property value petitioned for annexation; (b) a
plat or map of the area to be annexed accompanied the petition; and (c) the petition and
plat or map were filed with Provo City's Recorder. R. 561.
4.

The 1978 annexation did not create unincorporated islands. R. 1073-74.

Much of the incorporated lands did belong to the United States, but federal lands are not
usually assessed, valued, or taxed by the state or county. R. 1061; 1069-71. Also, on
June 5, 1979, Provo and Uinta National Forest, USD A, signed a Memorandum of
Understanding involving mutual responsibilities with respect to the annexed lands.
R. 554-57.
5.

On January 19, 1978, a map of the annexed property and a copy of the

annexation resolution were filed by Provo with the Utah County Recorder's Office.
R. 417-19; 703. See partial map enlargement, R. 703, Ex. F to Addendum.
6.

Under official seal of the Lieutenant Governor/Secretary of State, on

February 28, 1978, he certified that a copy of the Articles of Amendment to the Articles

5

of Incorporation of Provo City's 1978 annexation was filed with his office in compliance
with Utah Code Ann. §§ 10-2-108 and 10-2-401 (1977). R. 559-64.
7.

Assessment records of the Utah County Treasurer's Office (the entity that

assesses real property taxes in that county) list the names of property owners in the
annexed area and years real property taxes were paid of those property owners in Provo
City Taxing District 110 according to Utah County Real Property Owner Information
sheets. R. 827-1028; 1061, 1070; 1029-32; 1034; 1052-55; 1472-73.
8.

People or entities in Provo City Taxing District 110 paid real property taxes

to Utah County in the early 1980s, based upon Utah County assessments of the annexed
areas and the levies of relevant taxing entities. See id.
9.

The following individuals or entities, all petitioners for annexation, were

assessed by and paid taxes to Utah County on lands in Provo City Taxing District 110
(assessment years are listed in parentheses): John S. Belmont (1981-2005); Floyd Dixon
(1982-2005); Wilderness Associates, Inc. (1981-1983); Goodlife, Johnson & L (1981);
David Grow (1982-1988); Paddy Assoc. (1982-1984); and Steven Grow (1985-1988).
R.1029-32; 1034; 1052-55; 1061.
10.

At the time of the 1978 annexation, Utah Code Ann. § 10-2-403 (1977)

provided as follows:
Annexation deemed conclusive. Whenever the inhabitants
of any territory annexed to any municipality pay property tax
levied by the municipality for one or more years following the
annexation and no inhabitants of the territory protests (sic) the
6

annexation during the year following the annexation, the
territory shall be conclusively presumed to be properly
annexed to the annexing municipality. ..
Ex. D to Addendum (emphasis added).
11.

Mr. Davis does not claim nor provide evidence that any original owner of

lands included in the 1978 annexation (including his predecessors in interest) ever
protested the 1978 annexation. R. 1071; 1472; Appellant Br. 3-4, 10-11.
12.

Mr. Davis acquired a one-half undivided interest in the Property by

warranty deeds dated April 16 and April 20, 1998. R. 170; 174; 240-44.
13.

At or shortly after he acquired his interests in the Property, Mr. Davis knew

those lands were located within Provo's city limits. R. 1799; 1800-804.
14.

At the time Mr. Davis first obtained his interests in the Property, Utah

Code Ann. § 10-2-422 read as follows:
Conclusive presumption of annexation. An area annexed to
a municipality under this part shall be conclusively presumed
to have been validly annexed if:
(1) the municipality has levied and the taxpayers within the
area have paid property taxes for more than one year after the
annexation; and
(2) no resident of the area has contested the annexation in a
court of proper jurisdiction during the year following
annexation.
Ex. D to Addendum (emphasis added).
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15.

Provo does not claim it assessed real property taxes against the land in

which Mr. Davis claims an interest. The City does assert that it levied a general city
property tax rate for all real property within its city limits. Most of the property annexed
in 1978 was assigned by Utah County to Provo City Taxing District No. 110. The county
made and collected assessments on real property in City Taxing District 110 presumably
based on a municipal levy by Provo. See R. 1052-55, 1961.
16.

Mr. Davis makes no claim that he, his predecessors, or anyone else,

contested the 1978 annexation in a court of competent jurisdiction within one year or four
years of the 1978 annexation. Appellant Br. 3-4.
17.

He filed no court action to contest the 1978 annexation within one year or

four years of the time he acquired his interests in the subject Property. R. 1052-55, 1961.
(By making this observation, Provo does not admit Mr. Davis ever had any right to
contest the 1978 annexation.)
18.

At all times relevant to this action, § 78-12-25(3) of the Utah Code

provided, and now provides: "An action may be brought within four years: . . . For relief
not otherwise provided for by law."
19.

On November 23, 2005, more than seven (7) years after he obtained his

interests in the Property, Mr. Davis filed an amended complaint in which he first named
Provo as a party defendant and claimed the city "illegally annexed" the Property as part of
the 1978 annexation. R. 417-78.
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20.

Provo filed a motion to dismiss Mr. Davis' claim that Provo's 1978

annexation was invalid. The district court treated Provo's motion to dismiss as a motion
for summary judgment. R. 517-18, 1879.
21.

Provo argued its motion to dismiss/motion for summary judgment on

April 13, 2006. The trial court allowed both parties to submit supplemental memoranda
on the statute of limitations issues. R. 1751 and unstamped page btw R. 1783 and 1784.
22.

During the oral argument, Mr. Davis' counsel stated that his client's

wrongful annexation claim did not involve quiet title issues. R. 1791.
23.

On June 28, 2006, the trial court issued a Memorandum Decision granting

Provo's motion to dismiss on the statute of limitations issue. R. 1839-42; Ex. A to
Addendum, pp. 1-4.
24.

Provo generally concurs with the language of and rulings in that

Memorandum Decision. However, Provo does not agree with any reading of that ruling
that indicates or suggests Provo never levied any tax on real property annexed in 1978.
IcL at 3.
25.

On September 20, 2006, the District Court entered an Order Granting

Provo's Motion to Dismiss and Related Rulings. R. 1877-79; Ex. B to Addendum,
pp. 1-2.
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1.

Mr. Davis' claim that the 1978 Annexation was invalid is barred by the

four-year statute of limitations in Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25(3). Sections 10-2-403
(1977) and 10-2-422 (2006) are not procedural statutes of limitation, but rather
substantive conclusive presumptions that do not override § 78-12-25(3).
2.

The conclusive presumptions, set forth in §§ 10-2-403 and 10-2-422, bar

Mr. Davis' seventh claim because the city levied taxes that were assessed and collected
by Utah County shortly after the 1978 annexation. Since neither Mr. Davis nor his
predecessors timely protested that annexation, the conclusive presumptions bar
Mr. Davis' belated attempt to contest or set aside the annexation.
3.

Provo fully or substantially followed the applicable Utah annexation laws in

effect in 1978 and thereafter. As a result, the 1978 Annexation is deemed valid. Neither
Mr. Davis nor his successors protested the annexation within a reasonable time and
therefore his belated attempt to do so now is barred.
ARGUMENTS
I.

AS A MATTER OF LAW, MR. DAVIS' SEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION
AGAINST PROVO IS BARRED BY UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-12-25(3).
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25(3) provides that an action may be brought within four

years: "for relief not otherwise provided by law." In a recent decision, this Court noted
with approval the " . . .well-established general rule that the catch-all statute of limitations
'applies to all actions for relief that [are] not otherwise covered by any other section.'" In
10

re Hoopiiaina Trust (Nolan v. Hoopiiaiana), 2006 UT 53, <f 23. 114 P.3d 1129. In the
landmark case, Branting v. Salt Lake City, 153 P. 995 (Utah 1915), this Court applied a
predecessor of § 78-12-25(3) to a taxpayer action that sought to void a city tax plaintiff
claimed was illegally assessed. The Court wrote:
That [the precursor] section applies to all actions for relief...
not otherwise covered by any other section. Where therefore
affirmative relief is sought, as is this case, that section applies
with full force. . . .
I d at 311.
In its Memorandum Decision and Order (Exhibits A and B of Addendum), the trial
court held the four-year statute of limitations in § 78-12-25(3) governs this action. In
following § 78-12-25(3) instead of § 10-2-422 (or its predecessor § 10-2-403 (1977)), the
lower court ruled the latter is not a true statute of limitations, but rather a ". . . conclusive
limitation that can defeat a challenge to an annexation, but it does not prevent a
challenge, which is the function of a statute of limitations." Mem. Dec, Ex. B to
Addendum, at p. 3 (emphasis added).
The crux of Mr. Davis' appellate argument is that present § 10-2-422 and past
§ 10-2-403 are statutes of limitation. Appellant Br. 7-12. The trial court properly ruled
they are not.
The headings and texts of both §§ 10-2-422 and 10-2-403 only deal with
conclusive presumptions about annexations. They neither are, nor purport to be, statutes
of limitation. Provo's Statement of Facts H 10, 14. A conclusive presumption is a rule
11

of substantive law couched as a rule of evidence. Jerome Prince, Richardson on Evidence
34 (9th ed. 1964). "Conclusive presumptions . . . prescribe substantive rights, and are not
merely rules of remedy." Buhler v. Maddison. 176 P.2d 118 (Utah 1947) (citation
omitted). Neither of the statutes Mr. Davis cites grant a property owner a right in
perpetuity to void a decades-old annexation. Mem. Dec, Ex. A of Addendum at p. 3.
A statute of limitations is not synonymous with a conclusive presumption.
Unlike the latter which define substantive rights (here the right to contest the fact of an
annexation), "statutes of limitation are essentially procedural in nature . . . and do not
abolish a right to sue." Utah v. Lusk, 2001 UT 102, <J[ 28, 37 P.3d 1103 (citation omitted)
(emphasis added). The function of a statute of limitations is to establish the time within
which suit must be filed. As this Court has noted:
Statutes of limitation are essentially procedural in nature and
establish a prescribed time within which an action must be
filed after it accrues. They do not abolish a substantive right
to sue, but simply provide that if an action is not filed within
the specified time, the remedy is deemed to have been waived
unless the plaintiff did not know of the facts giving rise to the
cause of action. . . .
Lee v. Gaufin, 867 P.2d 572, 575 (Utah 1993) (citation omitted).
In Utah the essential purposes of a statute of limitations are twofold: 1) to prevent
the assertion of stale claims against a defendant; and 2) to have claims timely litigated
before evidence is lost, memories fade, or witnesses are unavailable. Those principles
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apply here and are summarized in Vigos v. Mountain Builders. Inc.. 2000 UT 2, 993 P.2d
207, where this Court noted:
Statutes of limitations are intended to prevent unfair dilatory
litigation against a defendant and to require that claims be
litigated while proper investigation and preservation of
evidence can occur. Examples of unfair litigation include
surprise or ambush claims, fictitious and fraudulent claims,
and stale claims, (citation omitted). Evidentiary problems
include lost evidence, faded memories and disappearing
witnesses.
I d at 122.
This Court similarly noted in Lund v. Hall 938 P.2d 285 (Utah 1997):
It is generally recognized that the purpose of statutes of
limitations is to encourage promptness in the prosecution of
actions and thus avoid the injustice which may result from the
prosecution of stale claims. Statutes of limitations attempt to
protect against the difficulties caused by lost evidence, faded
memories and disappearing witnesses.
I d at 291.
The trial court properly noted that while § 78-12-25(3) achieves both functions of
a pure statute of limitations, §§ 10-2-422 and 10-2-403 do neither. Mem. Dec, Ex. A to
Addendum, at p. 3. The respective headings and texts of both statutes merely describe
conclusive presumptions against a party wishing to contest an annexation. Perhaps more
significantly, in addressing a similar annexation statute (that became effective after
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§ 10-2-403, but before § 10-2-422), the Utah Court of Appeals described that law1 as
merely a conclusive presumption of a substantive right, noting: ". . . The only substantive
protection for residents is the presumption of proper annexation mandated by
§ 10-2-423 . . . ." Mesa Dev. Co. v. Sandv City. 948 P.2d 366, 370 (Utah App. 1997).
The Court nowhere referred to § 10-2-423 as a statute of limitations. It simply held that
the plaintiff lacked standing to contest § 10-2-423's "conclusive presumption of valid
annexation." Id. at 371.
Mr. Davis also claims that since § 10-2-422 and its predecessor are more specific
statutes of limitation than § 78-12-25(3), they rather than the catch-all statute should
control this action. Appellant Br. 8-9. The first flaw in this argument is that neither
§§ 10-2-422 nor 10-2-403 are true statutes of limitations. He cites no authority for his
claim that conclusive presumptions (that abolish a right to sue) take precedence over a
statute of limitations (that limits the time within which a party may bring an action).
Provo has not been able to find any such Utah authority. In addition, the two cases Mr.
Davis does cite (Appellant Br. 8-9) for his argument that a more specific statute of
limitations controls over a more general one are not analogous to the facts presented in

1

Former § 10-2-423 (1996) provided: Whenever the residents of any territory
annexed to any municipality pay property taxes levied by the municipality for one or more
years following the annexation and no residents of the territory contest the annexation in a
court of proper jurisdiction during the year following the annexation, the territory shall be
conclusively presumed to be properly annexed to the annexin municipality, (cited in
Mesa Dev. Co. v. Sandv Citv. 948 P.2d 366, 368 (Utah App. 1997)).
14

this case. Carter v. Univ. of Utah Medical Center, 2006 UT 78, 150 P.3d 467, involved
neither a conclusive presumption nor a statute of limitation. In that case two venue
statutes conflicted with each other. Those facts are not at all this case. South Carolina v.
Columbus, 528 S.E.2d 408 (S.C. 2000) dealt with a conflict between two statutes of
limitations that were both located within the South Carolina Code's limitation of actions
§ 5-3-101, et seq. Neither Carter nor the non-Utah Columbus decisions involved a
conflict between a statute of limitations and conclusive presumptions. Thus, both
decisions are inapposite.
Finally, in Quick Safe-T Hitch, Inc. v. RSB Systems, 2000 UT 84, 12 P.3d 577, a
case involving the issue of which of two statutes of limitations applied to a plaintiff s
claim, this Court noted that a statute of limitations is one that limits the time in which an
action may be brought. Reading §§ 78-12-1 and 78-12-25(3) together:
The plain language of these two sections clearly requires that
section 78-12-25(3)'s four year "catch-all" statute of
limitations be applied to claims for which the legislature has
not enacted a more specific statute restricting the time in
which a particular claim may be brought.
Id at f 15 (emphasis added).
The trial court correctly determined that the catch-all, four-year statute in
§ 78-12-25(3) applied to the claims asserted in the plaintiffs Seventh Cause of
Action. That reasoning is logically sound, supported by appropriate Utah case
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law and statutory authority, and supports the legitimate public policy goal of finality by
avoiding a belated challenge to an annexation years after the fact where no timely
objection or challenge has ever been raised by the current property owner or his
predecessors.
II.

MR. DAVIS5 SEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST PROVO IS ALSO
BARRED BY UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-2-403 AND/OR ITS SUCCESSOR
STATUTE, § 10-2-422.
If, for the limited purposes of this argument only, we assume that Mr. Davis'

Seventh Cause of Action is not barred by the statute of limitation set out in § 78-12-25(3),
it is still barred by the conclusive presumption provisions in prior §§ 10-2-403 or
10-2-422. Each of those statutes provides in essence, that where inhabitants (or residents)
of lands annexed by a city pay property taxes based upon a municipal levy at least one
year after the annexation and no inhabitant (or resident) protests during the year following
that annexation, those lands are conclusively presumed to have been properly annexed. It
is noteworthy that the municipality is not required to assess the specific amount of the
taxes for each property parcel (as that is the responsibility of the county). Neither is it
required that every landowner pay the assessed property taxes.
Here the annexation took place in 1978. R. 559-61. By the early 1980s, owners
of the annexed lands were assessed and the owners began paying real property taxes to
Utah County. R. 1029-32; 1034; 1052-55; 1061. Prior to the time those real property
taxes were paid, most of those properties had been assigned by the County to Provo
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Taxing District 110. Id. Provo acknowledges that the state "assesses all mines and
mining claims." R. 1061. There is an exception: where the state determines that "the
mining claims are used for other than mining purposes, in which case the value of mining
claims "shall be assessed by the assessor of the county in which the mining claims are
located." Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-201(l)(e) (2006). One parcel of annexed property (i.e.,
the Davis Property) was "incorrectly treated for valuation and taxation purposes."
R. 1061. If any mistake were made in assessing Mr. Davis' property, such would have
been by governmental agencies other than Provo City.
This Court may take judicial notice that a county can only place real property in a
city taxing district where the city has already annexed the land. A county can only assess
the landowners a real property tax where a municipality has levied a real property tax rate
generally applicable to real property within the city limits. If there is no evidence that a
landowner or inhabitant has protested during the year following the annexation, the
annexation is conclusively presumed valid. Here, it is uncontested that the Property in
question was annexed into the Provo City limits in 1978. The annexed lands were
assigned to a city taxing district. Real property tax assessments were made by the
County. Landowners within the city taxing district paid those real property taxes assessed
by the County. Absent any evidence of a landowner or inhabitant protesting within the
year after annexation, the conclusive presumption should apply and the annexation be
deemed effective.
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Contrary to Mr. Davis' assertion, nothing in either § 10-2-403 or its successor
statute even remotely suggests that a subsequent interest holder has a right in perpetuity to
successfully contest an annexation that took place without incident more than twenty
years earlier. Such an interpretation could wreak havoc on any prior annexation, and
under Mr. Davis' arguments, such a belated challenge could be made years, or even
decades, after the annexation, and long after intervening rights and responsibilities had
been established and relied upon by all interested parties.
Even if there had been some defect in the annexation process, a leading text
on municipal law presumes the validity of an annexation even if later it appears there
were irregularities:
The validity of changes of municipal boundaries is presumed,
in accordance with the general policy applicable to the
original creation of municipal corporations. Thus, after public
acquiescence for a considerable period, presumptions in favor
of the regularity of proceedings to attach territory to a
municipal corporation will be indulged, and this is true
although irregularities appear which would have defeated the
annexation if action had been taken in time. It will be
presumed, in favor of annexation, that the authorities properly
performed their duties, that the existence of jurisdictional
facts was found, and that, after annexation, the municipality
will act in conformity with the law.
2A McQuillan Mun. Corp., § 7.44 (3d ed. 1996).
For all of these reasons, the 1978 annexation should be conclusively presumed to
be valid, thus barring the seventh claim in the amended complaint.
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III.

MR. DAVIS' SEVENTH CLAIM IS FURTHER BARRED BY HIS
FAILURE OR THAT OF HIS PREDECESSORS-IN-INTEREST TO
CONTEST PROVO'S 1978 ANNEXATION WITHIN A REASONABLE
PERIOD OF TIME AFTER PROVO FULLY OR SUBSTANTIALLY
COMPLIED WITH THE THEN APPLICABLE UTAH ANNEXATION
STATUTES
Former Utah Code Ann. § 10-2-401 (1977) (see Ex. C to Addendum) outlined the

steps necessary for a city to properly annex new territory into its city limits. The salient
portions of § 10-2-401 at the time of the annexation are listed in numbered sequence
below. After each recitation of the cited statutory requirements, Provo's outlines its
actions and efforts to comply with the specific mandate of each cited statutory provision.
1) A majority of the real property owners and the owners of at least one-third in
value of the real property must petition the city for annexation of the real property in
question. Then, under the direction of the city engineer or surveyor, an accurate map or
plat of the proposed annexation territory is to be prepared. The map and a petition for
annexation must be submitted and filed with the City Recorder's Office. Ex. C to
Addendum.
la) Provo's 1978 annexation resolution recites:
WHEREAS, a majority of the owners of real property
and the owners of not less than one-third in value of the real
property as shown on the last assessment rolls in [the]
territory lying contiguous to this municipality have petitioned
this municipality for annexation; and
WHEREAS, the petition was accompanied by an
accurate plat or map of the territory to be annexed prepared
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under the supervision of the City Engineer or a competent
surveyor and certified by the engineer or surveyor; and
WHEREAS, the petition and plat or map have been
filed in the Office of the City Recorder.
R.561.
2) By at least a two-thirds vote, the governing body of the city must pass a
resolution to accept the petition for annexation and order the territory to be annexed
within the boundaries of the municipality. Utah Code Ann. § 10-2-401 (1977).
2a) The 1978 annexation resolutions recites that by a two to zero vote (with one
member excused), Annexation Resolution No. 5 passes, and that". . . The property herein
described which lies in Utah County is hereby declared annexed to Provo City." R. 561.
3) If the territory is annexed, a copy of the certified plat or map shall immediately
be filed with the county recorder, together with a certified copy of the annexation
resolution.
3a) Exhibit "H" to Mr. Davis' amended complaint includes a vicinity map of the
annexed territory, bearing apparent stamp no. 2567 with a recording date of January 19,
1978, made by the Utah County Recorder's Office plus a copy of the annexation
resolution, bearing apparent stamp no. 2568, with book and page numbers also apparently
stamped by the Utah County Recorder. R. 417-19; 703.
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4) The municipality's articles of incorporation are to be amended to reflect the
newly annexed territory, and a copy of the articles of amendment are to be filed with the
Utah Secretary of State and the county clerk as prescribed by Utah Code Ann. § 10-2-108.
4a) A certificate under seal of the Utah Lieutenant Governor/Secretary of State
recites that a certified copy of the Articles of Amendment to the Articles of Incorporation
of Provo City, annexing the property of the 1978 Annexation, and that those documents
comply with Utah Code Ann. §§ 10-2-108 and 10-2-401 (1977). Certified copies of the
Articles of Amendment and the Annexation Resolution are appended to the Secretary of
State certificate. R. 559-64.
After reciting each of the above steps that are needed to effectuate an annexation,
§ 10-2-401 concludes:
On filing the maps, plats and articles of amendment, the
annexation shall be deemed complete and the territory
annexed shall be deemed and held to be part of the annexing
municipality, and the inhabitants thereof shall enjoy the
privileges of the annexation and be subject to the ordinances,
resolutions and regulations of the annexing municipality.
Utah Code Ann. § 10-2-401 (1977) (emphasis added).
Where a reviewing court concludes a city has the statutory authority to annex real
property, and acts within the parameters of its authority in passing an annexation
resolution, "fixing municipal boundaries is a legislative function with which this Court
generally will not interfere." Sandy Citv v. City of South Jordan, 652 P.2d 1316,
1318-19 (Utah 1982). See also Freeman v. Centerville Citv. 600 P.2d 1003, 1005 (Utah
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1979). Annexation statutes grant a city broad discretion in making boundary changes.
Szatkowski v. Bountiful City, 906 P.2d 902, 904 (Utah App. 1995). Such statutes are
liberally construed in favor of the municipality. Id (citation omitted).
Courts generally will not interfere with the annexation process where a city has
substantially complied with the governing annexation statutes. Sweetwater Properties v.
Town of Alta, 622 P.2d 1178, 1183 (Utah 1981) ("Courts are almost unanimous in
holding that substantial compliance with annexation law is all that is required of
municipalities. . . ."), modified on rehearing 638 P.2d 1189 (Utah 1981), overruled on
other grounds, Pike v. Countryside Annexation v. Vernal City, 711 P.2d 240 (Utah 1985).
In Dotv v. Town of Cedar Hills, 565 P.2d 993 (Utah 1982), this Court indicated if a city
can show ". . . either actual or substantial compliance with Utah's annexation statute, the
annexation would have to be upheld." Id. at 996. See also Szatkowski, 906 P.2d at 904;
Sandy City v. City of South Jordan, 652 P.2d at 1319.
This Court summarized the effect of the § 10-2-401 (1977) where a city had fully
or partially complied with the statutory requirements:
When the appropriate maps, plats and documents . . . were
filed . . . the territory annexed was "deemed and held to be
part of the annexing municipality, and inhabitants thereof
shall enjoy the privileges of the annexation." The affidavits
filed with South Jordan's motion for summary judgment
establish that property taxes were paid by the inhabitants of
that territory for more than one year following annexation and
it is an undisputed fact that no inhabitants of the territory filed
a protest during the year following the annexation. Therefore,
by operation of the statute, the annexation was deemed
22

complete .. . and the propriety of the annexation was
conclusively presumed one year later.
Sandy City v. City of South Jordan, 652 P.2d at 1319. This was the statute in effect at the
time of Provo's 1978 annexation, and the date of this Court's decision in that case was
made at or near the time landowners within the annexed area had begun paying the
property taxes assessed by Utah County. Ex. C to Addendum, R. 827-1028; 1029-32,
1034; 1052-55; 1061.
Provo submits that the undisputed evidence in the record before the trial court
supports the conclusion that the City fully or substantially complied with the requirements
of Utah's annexation statutes that were in effect in 1978. At a minimum, the validity of
the 1978 Annexation is presumed. That presumption was not challenged by Mr. Davis
from 1978 until the filing of his amended complaint in 2005. For reasons already argued,
Provo claims any attempt to void the 1978 annexation is barred by either § 78-12-25(3) or
by conclusive presumptions set out in present Utah Code Ann. § 10-2-422 or in prior
§ 10-2-403.
Assuming, merely for the sake of argument, that neither the statute of limitations
nor the conclusive presumption bar Mr. Davis' Seventh Cause of Action, his claim is still
barred because neither he nor his predecessor-in-interest contested the validity of the
1978 annexation within a reasonable period of time. Even if § 78-12-25(3) does not
govern, and/or the conclusive presumptions do not apply, Mr. Davis does not have
unlimited time within which to bring this action. Where no specific time is given for
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some legal act to be done, the law requires action within a reasonable period of time. See
Laub v. South Central Utah Tel. Ass'n. 657 P.2d 1304, 1306-1307 (Utah 1982). That
principle has been held applicable to an annexation case. Johnson v. Sandy City. 497
P.2d 644, 646 (Utah 1972) (". . .where no definite time is specified for an act to be done
the usual rule is that it is required to be done at least within a reasonable time under the
circumstances") (city unduly delayed filing an annexation ordinance with the county
recorder). The principle of failure to act within a reasonable time is particularly
applicable to Mr. Davis' situation. In both its Memorandum Decision (Mem. Dec, Ex. A
to Addendum, at p. 3) and its Order (Ex. B to Addendum, at p. 2) the trial court correctly
ruled that Mr. Davis has no right to contest the 1978 Annexation. Rather, the Court
properly held:
The Court rejects Plaintiff's argument that either present
§ 10-2-422 or prior § 10-2-403 (1977) gives him a right in
perpetuity to contest an annexation by Provo which occurred
several decades before Plaintiff acquired interests in his
property.

Id
That language is both persuasive and legally correct. Provo asks that this Court
uphold the lower court ruling dismissing the seventh claim in Mr. Davis' amended
complaint.
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CONCLUSION
Mr. Davis' claim against Provo is barred by the four-year, catch-all statute of
limitations and by the conclusive presumptions contained in the two statutes frequently
cited in this brief. Even if those statutory provisions do not apply, the 1978 Annexation is
presumed valid and Mr. Davis and his predecessors in interest failed to contest the
annexation within a reasonable period of time
lis JUL
/ / day
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Memorandum Decision, Judge James R. Taylor, June 28, 2006
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Order Granting Defendant Provo's Motion to Dismiss and Related Rulings, Judge
James R. Taylor, September 20, 2006
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Laws of the State of Utah, 1977, § 10-2-401
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Laws of the State of Utah, 1977, § 10-2-403
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Utah Code Ann. § 10-2-422 (2006)

F.

Vicinity Map No. 2567
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EXfflBIT A
Memorandum Decision, Judge James R. Taylor, June 28,2006

FILED
Fourth Judicial District Court
of Utah County, SUrte of Utah
Deputy

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT,
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

Richard Davis,
Plaintiff,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Date: June 28, 2006

vs.

Case No.: 000403760

Greg Sperry, et al,

Division VII: Judge James R. Taylor

Defendants.

This matter comes before the Court on a Motion to Dismiss by Provo City. Oral.
arguments were held on April 13, 2006 and this matter has been subsequently briefed. For the
reasons stated below, Provo City's motion is granted.
Factual Background
When reviewing a motion to dismiss, the Court accepts the factual allegations in the
complaint as true and "interprets those facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in a
light most favorable to the plaintiff as the nonmoving party." Russell Packard Dev. v. Carson.
108 P.3d 741, 743 (Utah 2005). The facts are recited accordingly. In 1978, Provo City annexed
a large tract of land known as the Heritage Mountain Annexation. In 1998, Plaintiff Richard
Davis and Defendant Greg Sperry recorded interests in property that lies within the Heritage
Mountain Annexation. According to an affidavit by Davis, Provo City has never levied any
Page 1 of 5

property taxes on the property while he has had an interest. In his amended complaint filed on
November 23, 2005, Davis asserts that Provo City's annexation of his property was done
illegally, making the annexation void. Provo City's seeks to dismiss the Seventh Cause of
Action in Davis' amended complaint, the only cause of action against them in this case.
Motion to Dismiss
Provo asserts three different grounds for dismissal: statute of limitations, laches, and the
Governmental Immunity Act of Utah. Davis has filed a U.R.C.P. 56(f) request for extension of
time for discovery for this motion. Beginning with the statute of limitations, Provo asserts that
Davis' claim is barred by a statute of limitations under U.C.A. § 78-12-25(3). In response, Davis
argues that another statute, U.C.A. § 10-2-422, trumps the four-year limitation, allowing him to
still seek relief against Provo.
Under U.C.A § 78-12-1, civil actions "may be commenced only within the periods
prescribed in this chapter... except in specific cases where a different limitation is prescribed by
statute." Further, U.C.A. § 78-12-25(3) provides that "an action maybe brought within four
years: for relief not otherwise provided for by law." These sections require that the four-year
limitation "be applied to claims for which the legislature has not enacted a more specific statute
restricting the time in which a particular claim may be brought." Quick Safe-T Hitch. Inc. v.
RSB Svs- 12 P.3d 577, 579 (Utah 2000).
Provo asserts that the four-year limit applies because a "different limitation" does not
exist. Davis claims that UCA § 10-2-422 is a "different limitation" under U.C.A. § 78-12-1,
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which would take their cause of action out of the four-year limitation. UCA § 10-2-422, which
was substantively the same statute at the time of annexation, provides:
An area annexed to a municipality under this part [U.C.A. §§ 10-2-401 to 10-2-428] shall
be conclusively presumed to have been validly annexed if:
(1) the municipality has levied and the taxpayers within the area have paid property taxes
for more than one year after annexation; and
(2) no resident of the area has contested the annexation in a court of proper jurisdiction
during the year following annexation.
Because Provo City has never levied taxes on Davis while he has owned the property, the
property cannot be "conclusively presumed to have been validly annexed." Davis asserts that
U.C.A. § 10-2-422 is a statute of limitations that has not yet run against him, allowing him to
bring suit against the annexation that took place in 1978.
The general goals of statutes of limitations are "to prevent unfair dilatory litigation
against a defendant and to require that claims be litigated while proper investigation and
preservation of evidence can occur." Vigos v. Mountainland Builders, Inc.. 993 P.2d 207, 213
(Utah 2000). U.C.A. § 10-2-422 accomplishes neither of these, instead it is a conclusive
limitation that can defeat a challenge to an annexation, but it does not prevent a challenge, which
is the function of a statute of limitations. Adopting Davis' interpretation that U.C.A. § 10-2-422
is the proper statute of limitations in this matter, would allow annexations to be challenged in
perpetuity as long as property taxes were not levied against a piece of property by Provo City.
This Court finds that this matter falls within the catchall four-year limitation in U.C.A. § 78-1225(3), barring Davis' challenge to the 1978 annexation. Davis has not asserted that the four years
should be tolled in any manner. Therefore, Provo City's motion to dismiss the Seventh Cause of
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Action in Davis' Amended Complaint is granted. Because Davis is barred by the statute of
limitations, the Court will not address Provo's alternative arguments regarding laches and the
Utah Governmental Immunity Act. Further, Davis' Rule 56(f) motion is denied because it
requests discovery to determine whether U.C.A. § 10-2-422 is applicable, which this decision
moots. The Court orders Provo City to prepare an order for the Court's signature consistent with
this decision.
Dated this

day of s^X

Judge Jai
Fourth

A certificate of mailing is on the following page.
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Steven F. Allred
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Orem, Utah 84058
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EXHIBIT B
Order Granting Defendant Provo's Motion to Dismiss and Related Rulings,
Judge James R. Taylor, September 20, 2006

FILED
Fourth Judicial D J ^ C ^
of Utah County, bijie of Utan
^fh-61^

Deputy

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT,
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

RICHARD DAVIS
Plaintiff.
vs.
GREG SPERRY, STEPHEN KAPELOW,
LOREN KAPELOW, DESIGN WEST,
LLC, RED SLAB, LLC, JOHN L.
VALENTINE, and PROVO CITY
CORPORATION,

ORDER GRANTING
DEFENDANT PROVO'S
MOTION TO DISMISS
AND RELATED RULINGS
Case No. 00403760
Division VII: Judge James R. Taylor

Defendants
Defendant, Provo City Corporation ("Provo"), filed a motion to dismiss the
Seventh Cause of Action in Plaintiff Richard Davis' ("Plaintiff'), Amended and
Supplemental Complaint. In opposing Provo's motion to dismiss, plaintiff also filed a
Rule 56(f) motion and various motions to strike affidavits filed by Provo. Plaintiff and
Provo filed affidavits, pre- and post- hearing memoranda and argued their respective
positions before the Court at oral arguments held on April 13, 2006. The Court read all
memoranda, heard the arguments, and entered a memorandum decision dated June 28,
2006. Deeming itself apprised of the issues before it, the Court enters this Order, the
relevant terms of which are:
1.

Provo's motion to dismiss the Seventh Cause of Action in Plaintiffs

Amended and Supplemental Complaint is granted. That Seventh Cause of Action

against Provo is dismissed with prejudice and on the merits as such claim is barred by
the four-year statute of limitations found in U.C.A., § 78-12-25 (3). U.C.A. § 78-12-25(3)
disposes of the issues now before the Court, notwithstanding the arguments plaintiff
asserts as to U.C.A. § 10-2-422 and/or its predecessor § 10-2-403 (1977).
2.

The Court rejects Plaintiffs argument that either present § 10-2-422 or

prior § 10-2-403 (1977) gives him a right in perpetuity to contest an annexation by Provo
which occurred several decades before Plaintiff acquired interests in his property.
3.

As Plaintiffs Seventh Cause of Action against Provo is barred by the

statute of limitations in U.C.A. § 78-12-25(3), the Court neither addresses nor dismisses
Provo's alternative arguments of Plaintiffs laches, his failure to file a notice of claim or
his failure to file an undertaking as provided by the Utah Governmental Immunity Act.
4.

Plaintiffs URCP Rule 56(f) motion is denied because Plaintiff by such

motion seeks only to discover matters applicable to U.C.A. § 10-2-422, which does not
control the facts of or issues in this case, and which request is mooted by this Order.
5.

Plaintiffs motions to strike the affidavits of LaNice Groesbeck, Randall

Covington, Karen Jordan, Camille S. Williams and Rick Romney are all denied as
Plaintiffs objections go to the weight, and not admissibility, of these affiants' testimony.
Dated this^fO day ottftdy, 20c

Judge Jgmes KTTaylor,
FourthsJudicial District CoXrt
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day of July, 2006,1 mailed a copy of the foregoing Order Granting
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David C. Dixon, Esq.
Camille S. Williams, Esq.
James L. Wilde, Esq.
Provo City Attorney's Office
351 West Center Street
P.O. Box 1849
Provo, Utah 84603
Michael N. Zundel, Esq.
James A Boevers, Esq.
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175 East 400 South
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John L. Valentine, Esq.
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EXHIBIT C
Laws of the State of Utah, 1977, $ 10-2-MH

LAWS
of the

STATE OF UTAH, 1977
Passed at the

FORTY-SECOND REGULAR SESSION
<il I lie I ,<>};islature

Convened at the Capitol in the City of Salt Lake
January 10,1977
and Adjourned Sine Die on
March 10,1977

Published by Authi

Ch. 48

CITIES, TOWNS AND SUBDIVISIONS

[228]

(2) Any census conducted, or population estimate of the -Utah
department of employment security conducted. for the purpose of
determining the population of any municipality shall be considered an
official census and may be used for any purpose for which population is a
factor.
10-2-303. Change of class not to affect property rights, contract rights
or actions at law.
Whenever a municipality changes from one class to another class all
property, property rights and rights of every kind which belonged to or
where vested in the municipality at the time of the change shall belong to
and be vested in it after the change; and no contract, claim or right of the
municipality or demand or liability against it, shall be altered or affected in
any way by the change; and the change shall not have any effect on or in any
action at law, prosecution, business, work and proceedings shall continue
and may be conducted and proceed as if no change in classification of the
municipality had taken place; but when a different remedy is given by law
and is applicable to any right which the municipality possessed at the time
of the change in classification the remedy shall be cumulative to the remedy
applicable before the change, and may be so used.
10-2-304. Ordinances to continue in force—No change in identity.
All ordinances, orders and resolutions in force in any municipality when
it becomes another class of municipality insofar as the ordinances, orders
and resolutions are not repugnant to law, shall continue in full force and
effect until repealed or amended, and the change in the classification of the
municipality shall have no effect. The change in classification of any
municipality shall not in any way change the identity of the municipality.
IV >

)hang E; of c la sses—-Officers.

When by proclamation of the governor, any municipality shall become a
municipality of another class, the officers then in office shall continue to be
the officers of the municipality until their respective terms of office expire,
and until their successors shall be duly elected and qualified.
10-2-306. Judicial notice taken of existence and class.
All courts in this state shall take judicial notice of the existence and
classification of any municipality.
PART 4
EXTENSION OF CORPORATE LIMITS
10-2-401. Annexation of contiguous territory.
Whenever a majority of the owners of real property and the owners of at
least one third in value of the real property, as shown by the last assessment
roles, in territory lying contiguous to the corporate boundaries of any

[229]
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municipality, shall desire to annex such territory to such municipality, they
shall cause an accurate plat or map of such territory to be made under the
supervision of the municipal engineer or a competent surveyor, and a copy of
such plat or map, certified by the engineer or surveyor as the case may be,
shall be filed in the office of the recorder of the municipality, together with a
written petition signed by a majority of the real property owners and by the
owners of not less than one third in value of the real property, as shown by
the last assessment roles, of the territory described in the plat or map; and
the governing body of the municipality, at a regular meeting shall vote on
the question of such annexation. The members of the governing body may
by resolution passed by a two-thirds vote, accept the petition for annexation,
subject to the terms and conditions as they deem reasonable, and the
territory shall then and there be annexed and within the boundaries of the
municipality. If the territory is annexed,, a copy of the duly certified plat or
map shall at once be filed in the office of the county recorder, together with
a certified copy of the resolution declaring the annexation. The articles of
incorporation of the municipality shall be amended to sho w the new
territory annexed to the municipality and copy of the articles of amendment
shall be filed with the secretary of state and county clerk or clerks in the
same manner as prescribed in 10-2-108. On filing the. maps, plats and
articles of amendment, the annexation shall be deemed complete and the
territory annexed shall be deemed and held to be part of the annexing
municipality, and the inhabitants thereof shall enjoy the privileges of the
annexation and be subject to the ordinances, resolutions and regulations of
the annexing municipality.
10-2-402. Limitations on annexation.
^ In 110 event shall the governing body of it municipality approve
annexations which would result in unincorporated islands being left within
jthe boundaries of the municipality, but existing islands or peninsulas within
^municipality at the effective date of this act may be annexed in portions,
levying islands if a public hearing is held, and the governing body of such
municipality passes a resolution to the effect that the creation or leaving of
an island is in the interest of the municipality.
10-2-403. Annexation deemed conclusive.
u
^ • / ^ l e n e v e r t*16 inhabitants of any territory annexed to any municipality
| f y property tax levied by the municipality for one or more years following
j ^ a n n e x a t i o n and no inhabitants of the territory protests the annexation
S|£Mg the year following the annexation, the territory shall be conclusively
l^sumed to be properly annexed to the annexing municipality.
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municipality, shall desire to annex such territory to such municipality, they
shall cause an accurate plat or map of such territory to be made under the
supervision of the municipal engineer or a competent surveyor, and a copy of
such plat or map, certified by the engineer or surveyor as the case may be,
shall be filed in the office of the recorder of the municipality, together with a
written petition signed by a majority of the real property owners and by the
owners of not less than one third in value of the real property, as shown by
the last assessment roles, of the territory described in the plat or map; and
the governing body of the municipality, at a regular meeting shall vote on
the question of such annexation. The members of the governing body may
by resolution passed by a two-thirds vote, accept the petition for annexation,
subject to the terms and conditions as they deem reasonable, and the
territory shall then and there be annexed and within the boundaries of the
municipality. If the territory is annexed, a copy of the duly certified plat or
map shall at once be filed in the office of the county recorder, together with
a certified copy of the resolution declaring the annexation. The articles of
incorporation of the municipality shall be amended to show the new
territory annexed to the municipality and copy of the articles of amendment
shall be filed with the secretary of state and county clerk or clerks in the
same manner as prescribed in 10-2-108. On filing the, maps, plats and
articles of amendment, the annexation shall be deemed complete and the
territory annexed shall be deemed and held to be part of the annexing
municipality, and the inhabitants thereof shall enjoy the privileges of the
annexation and be subject to the ordinances, resolutions and regulations of
the annexing municipality.
10-2-402. Limitations on annexation.
In no event shall the governing body of a municipality approve
annexations which would result in unincorporated islands being left within
Jhe boundaries of the municipality, but existing islands or peninsulas within
& municipality at the. effective date of this act may be annexed in portions,
levying islands if a public hearing is held, and the governing body of such
^municipality passes a resolution to the effect that the creation or leaving of
.an island is in the interest of the municipality.
10-2-403. Annexation deemed conclusive.
tt.^ ^ e n e v e r ^ e inhabitants of any territory annexed to any municipality
mM P r o p e r ^ ^ a x levied by the municipality for one or more years following
Pi£ annexation and no inhabitants of the territory protests the annexation
K s £ ^ g ^ e y e a r Stowing the annexation, the territory shall be conclusively
| 0 ^ m e d to be properly annexed to the annexing municipality.
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municipal legislative body to adjust a common boundary;
(ii) hold a public hearing on the proposed adjustment no less than 60 days after the adoption of the
resolution under Subsection (2)(a)(i); and
(iii) (A) publish notice at least once a week for
three successive weeks in a newspaper of general
circulation within the municipality; or
(B) if there is no newspaper of general circulation within the municipality, post at least one
notice per 1,000 population in places within the
municipality t h a t are most likely to give notice to
residents of the municipality,
(b) The notice required under Subsection (2)(a)(iii)
hall:
(i) state that the municipal legislative body has
adopted a resolution indicating the municipal legislative body's intent to adjust a boundary that the
municipality has in common with another municipality;
(ii) describe the area proposed to be adjusted;
(iii) state the date, time, and place of the public
hearing required under Subsection (2)(a)(ii);
(iv) state in conspicuous and plain terms that the
municipal legislative body will adjust the boundaries
unless, at or before the public hearing under Subsection (2)(a)(ii), written protests to the adjustment are
filed by the owners of private real property that:
(A) is located within the area proposed for
adjustment;
(B) covers at least 25% of the total private
land area within the area proposed for adjustment; and
(C) is equal in value to at least 15% of the
value of all private real property within the area
proposed for adjustment; and
(v) state that the area that is the subject of the
boundary adjustment will, because of the boundary
adjustment, be automatically annexed to a local district providing fire protection, paramedic, and emergency services, as provided in Section 17B-2-515.5, if:
(A) the municipality to which the area is being
added because of the boundary adjustment is
entirely within the boundaries of a local district:
(I) that provides fire protection, paramedic, and emergency services; and
(II) in the creation of which an election
was not required because of Subsection 17B2-214(3)(c); and
(B) the municipality from which the area is
being taken because of the boundary adjustment
is not within the boundaries of the local district;
and
(vi) state that the area proposed for annexation to
the municipality will be automatically withdrawn
from a local district providing fire protection, paramedic, and emergency services, as provided in Subsection 17B-2-601(2), if:
(A) the municipality to which the area is being
added because of the boundary adjustment is not
within the boundaries of a local district:
(I) t h a t provides fire protection, paramedic, and emergency services; and
(II) in the creation of which an election
was not required because of Subsection 17B2-214(3)(c); and

(c) The first publication of the notice required under
Subsection (2)(a)(iii)(A) shall be within 14 days of the
municipal legislative body's adoption of a resolution under
Subsection (2)(a)(i).
(3) Upon conclusion of the public hearing under Subsection
(2)(a)(ii), the municipal legislative body may adopt an ordinance adjusting the common boundary unless, at or before the
hearing under Subsection (2)(a)(ii), written protests to the
adjustment have been filed with the city recorder or town
clerk, as the case may be, by the owners of private real
property that:
(a) is located within the area proposed for adjustment;
(b) covers at least 25% of the total private land area
within the area proposed for adjustment; and
(c) is equal in value to at least 15% of the value of all
private real property within the area proposed for adjustment.
(4) The municipal legislative body shall comply with the
requirements of Section 10-2-425 as if the boundary change
were an annexation.
(5) An ordinance adopted under Subsection (3) becomes
effective when each municipality involved in the boundary
adjustment has adopted an ordinance under Subsection (3)
and as determined under Subsection 10-2-425(5) if the boundary change were an annexation.
2005
10-2-420.

B o n d s not affected by boundary adjustments
or annexations — Payment of property taxes.
(1) A boundary adjustment or annexation under this part
may not jeopardize or endanger any general obligation or
revenue bond.
(2) A bondholder may require the payment of property
taxes from any area that:
(a) was included in the taxable value of the municipality or other governmental entity issuing the bond at the
time the bond was issued; and
(b) is no longer within the boundaries of the municipality or other governmental entity issuing the bond due to
the boundary adjustment or annexation.
1997
10-2-421. Electric utility service in a n n e x e d area —
Reimbursement for value of facilities.
(1) If the electric consumers of the area being annexed are
receiving electric utility services from sources other than the
annexing municipality, the municipality may not, without the
consent of the electric utility, furnish its electric utility services to the electric consumers until the municipality has
reimbursed the electric utility company that previously provided the services for the value of those facilities dedicated to
provide service to the annexed area.
(2) If the annexing municipality and the electric utility
cannot agree on the value, the state court having jurisdiction
shall determine the fair market value of those facilities, and
the municipality shall reimburse the fair market value, as
determined by the court, to the electric utility company 2001
10-2-422. Conclusive presumption of annexation.
An area annexed to a municipality under this part shall be
conclusively presumed to have been validly annexed if:
(1) the municipality has levied and the taxpayers
within the area have paid property taxes for more than
one year after annexation; and
(2) no resident of the area has contested the annexation in a court of proper jurisdiction during the year
following annexation.
1997
10-2-423, 10-2-424.

Repealed.

1997
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